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I. INTRODUCTION
The key aim of this article is to provide an addition to the list of
practical examples of legal transplants by examining the legal history
of Namibia's mixed jurisdiction.1 As Walker and Pekmezovic argue,
the literature on legal transplants, while rich in theory, generally lists
few case studies or examples of the transplant process.2
The legal history of Namibia shows multiple challenges per-
taining to the amalgamation of laws originating from different legal
traditions. Apart from the customary law of indigenous tribes, the ori-
gins of which can be traced back thousands of years, the area of south-
western Africa that comprises the territory of modern-day Namibia3
has been subjected to the influence of three distinct legal families in
the last 130 years. The era of Imperial German colonialism started in
1884 and came to an end in 1915 when the Union of South Africa suc-
cessfully invaded Southwest-Africa.4 The highly controversial period
of South African occupation ended in 1990 when the Republic of
Namibia declared its independence.' As a result, German civil law,
English common law, and South African Roman-Dutch law have all
left their traces in Namibian legal history.
Because Southwest-Africa was neither fully integrated into the
German Empire nor annexed by the Union or Republic of South Africa,
but has remained a distinct legal entity, different legal influences pro-
vide rich material for studying the practical aspects of moving laws
from one jurisdiction to another. In addition, studying the provisions of
the Namibian Constitution may give insight into the extent to which
the founding fathers of the newly independent nation-state approved
of or changed the results of earlier influences.
After a brief overview of the notion of legal transplanting, this
article examines the introduction of German and South African laws to
Southwest-Africa and the provisions of the Namibian Constitution
pertaining to their continuing validity. Following a historical overview
1 See H. J. Erasmus, Roman Law and Common Law in Southern Africa: Past and
Future, in ROMAN LAW AT THE CROSSROADS 44 (Manfred 0. Hinz et al. eds., 2000)
(defining the term mixed jurisdiction).
2 Gordon Walker & Alma Pekmezovic, Legal Transplanting: International Finan-
cial Institutions and Secured Transactions Law Reform in South Pacific Island
Nations, 25 N.Z. U. L. REV. 560, 564 (2013).
3 Notwithstanding the respective political situation, this area will simply be re-
ferred to as Southwest-Africa in this article.
4 THE SOUTH WEST AFRICAINAMIBIA DISPUTE: DOCUMENTS AND SCHOLARLY WRIT-
INGS ON THE CONTROVERSY BETWEEN SOUTH AFRICA AND THE UNITED NATIONS 32
(John Dugard ed., University of California Press, 1973).
5 William Maley, Democratic Governance and Post-Conflict Transitions, 6 CHI. J.
INT'L L. 683, 689 (2006).
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of each period, this article analyzes and evaluates the respective
sources of law to determine if the law in force at the time constitutes a
legal transplant that contains an element of customization. Special re-
gard is given to the question of whether and to what extent the suc-
ceeding powers have reverted back to the legal system and the laws
established by their respective predecessors.
Based on these analyses, the author examines the practical
conflicts caused by the implementation of the German, South African,
and Namibian legal systems and laws. A concluding section attempts
to distill lessons learned and caveats for possible consideration in fu-
ture processes of legal transplanting.
II. LEGAL TRANSPLANTING
The phenomenon of legal transplants has been extensively
researched and is said to occur "where law travels from one jurisdic-
tion to another by way of transposition, imposition, reception or in-
tended borrowing."6 As Alan Watson points out, moving a system or a
rule of law from one country or people to another has been common
since the earliest recorded history.7
The desire to promote the rule of law in developing countries
through law reform projects,' often fostered by international financial
institutions, has rekindled academic interest in the transplantation of
laws as a means of legal development. Following Walker and
Pekmezovic's classification, 9 the legal transplant literature can be di-
vided into three strands:
Heralded by Watson, the first strand deems it possible to suc-
cessfully transplant both legal rules and structures into other jurisdic-
tions without having to consider the political structure of the donor
system or the political, social, or economic context of the transplant
law in the process.1 ° While not being a prerequisite for the success of
the process itself, such knowledge is merely presumed to facilitate a
more efficient execution of the transplant.1"
6 Chen Lei, Contextualizing Legal Transplant: China and Hong Kong, in METH-
ODS OF COMPARATIVE LAW 192 (2012).
7 ALAN WATSON, LEGAL TRANSPLANTS: AN APPROACH TO COMPARATIVE LAW 21 (2d.
ed. 1993).
8 See Thomas Carothers, The Rule-of-Law Revival, in PROMOTING THE RULE OF
LAW ABROAD: IN SEARCH OF KNOWLEDGE 7 (Thomas Carothers ed. 2006) (classify-
ing the different kinds of law reform projects).
9 Walker & Pekmezovic, supra note 2, at 563-64.
10 ALAN WATSON, LEGAL ORIGINS AND LEGAL CHANGE 293 (1991); see Walker &
Pekmezovic, supra note 2, at 563.
11 WATSON, supra note 10.
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A second strand emphasizes the non-transferable nature of
law, attributing shortcomings of transplantation attempts-the so-
called "transplant effect"-to the foreign source of transplanted laws.1 2
Its advocates argue against the universality of laws and highlight the
superior functionality of indigenous legal institutions and laws. 13
The third strand, favored by Walker and Pekmezovic,
presumes that law is connected to politics, economics, and culture
and-even though socio-economic, historic, or linguistic barriers may
arise-may be successfully transplanted if adequately customized or
adapted to the legal culture of the host jurisdiction.14 In order to ascer-
tain the required degree of such customization and the probability of a
transplant taking root, this view requires that the sociological, geo-
graphic, and political differences between donor and host jurisdiction
be considered.1 5
In this article, the author does not argue for any one of these
three strands. Instead, by looking at transplants that occurred in
Namibian legal history and "reverse-engineering" the processes used
for implementing such new rules of law, the author attempts to expose
and define the conflicts and difficulties encountered therein, while con-
sidering possible problems raised by all three strands.
The results of the analysis should not be overly generalized. As
Randall Peerenboom points out, the prescription of a common set of
"best-practices" for all countries or the establishment of "one-size-fits-
all, off-the-shelf blueprints" is prone to produce only meager and lack-
luster results.1" By looking at and evaluating the "craftsmanship" of
the transplantation processes in Namibian legal history, the author
seeks to assist in the creation of a workable methodology for law re-
form through legal transplants-a major task far beyond the scope of
this article.
12 Daniel Berkowitz et al., Economic Development, Legality and the Transplant
Effect 47 EuR. ECON. REV. 163, 167 (2003); see Walker & Pekmezovic, supra note 2,
at 563.
13 DOUGLASS C. NORTH, INSTITUTIONS, INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE, AND ECONOMIC
PERFORMANCE: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF INSTITUTIONS AND DECISIONS 3-35, 83-
104 (1990); Ronald J. Daniels & Michael Trebilcock, The Political Economy of Rule
of Law Reform in Developing Countries, 26 MICH. J. INT'L L. 99, 99-140 (2004); see
Walker & Pekmezovic, supra note 2, at 563-64.
14 Walker & Pekmezovic, supra note 2, at 564; Pierre Legrand, What "Legal
Transplants"?, in ADAPTING LEGAL CULTURES 55 (David Nelkin & Johannes Feest
eds., 2003); Otto Kahn-Freund, On the Uses and Misuses of Comparative Law, 37
MOD. L. REV. 1, 1-27 (1974).
15 Kahn-Freund, supra note 14, at 12-13.
16 Randall Peerenboom, Toward a Methodology for Successful Legal Transplants,
1 CHINESE J. CoMp. L 4, 4 (2013).
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III. LEGAL SYSTEMS IN NAMIBIA
This section of the article describes the formation and develop-
ment of the Namibian legal system on a macro level. For each of the
three major regimes-Imperial German colonialism, South African oc-
cupancy, and Namibian independence-a historical overview is fol-
lowed by an examination of the origins of the legal systems constituted
for Southwest-Africa by the relevant powers. For each period, an eval-
uation as to if and to what extent customized legal transplants have
been used for this purpose is provided. Where applicable, this article
gives special regard to the question of whether and to what extent the
regime in power drew on the legal system put in place by its predeces-
sor. After a closer look at the processes of customization or lack
thereof, this section analyzes the conflicts and shortcomings resulting
from the methods used by each regime.
A. Imperial German Colonial Period
1. Historical Overview
To be sure, the legal history of Southwest-Africa did not start
with Imperial German colonization. The origins of the indigenous
hunter-gatherer tribe of the San can be traced back to 5000 B.C., while
the present tribes of the Nama, Damara, Ovambo, and Herero mi-
grated to Southwest-Africa around the 14th century.1 7 Each of these
tribes had their own rules of law; mainly focusing on family law, the
right of succession, damages, and liabilities."l Though different in con-
tent, all these rules had one commonality: they were not recorded in
writing. Instead the native peoples passed on these rules via oral
tradition. "
Excluding two landings by the Portuguese sailors Diogo Cao
and Bartolomeu Dias in 1485 and 1487, the first advances of European
and South African missionaries and merchants can be dated to the
early 19th century.20 None of these endeavors, however, had a lasting
legal impact on Southwest-Africa.
The Imperial German colonial period began on April 24, 1884,
when Imperial Chancellor Bismarck instructed the German Consul in
17 WOLFGANG MULLER, VERFASSUNG VON NAMIBIA: ETHNISCHE VIELFALT UND ELE-
MENTE EINES MINDERHEITENSCHUTZES 58-70 (1992); JOHN H. WELLINGTON, SOUTH
WEST AFRICA AND ITS HUMAN ISSUES 129-57 (1967).
18 See OSKAR HINZ, CUSTOMARY LAW IN NAMIBIA: DEVELOPMENT AND PERSPECTIVE
(8th ed. 2003).
19 SAM AMOO, AN INTRODUCTION TO NAMIBIAN LAW 102-03 (2008).
20 j. H. ESTERHUYSE, SOUTH WEST AFRICA, 1880-1894: THE ESTABLISHMENT OF
GERMAN AUTHORITY IN SOUTH WEST AFRICA 8-10 (1968); UDO KAULICH, DIE GES-
CHICHTE DER EHEMALIGEN KOLONIE DEUTSCH-SuDWESTAFRIKA (1884-1914), at 40-
41 (2000).
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Cape Town via telegraph to officially declare to British officials that
the land on the coast of Southwest Africa, which the German merchant
Adolf Lideritz had bought from indigenous chieftains in the years
before, was now under protection of the German Empire.2 1 It ended on
July 9, 1915, when Imperial Governor Theodor Seitz surrendered at
Khorab in front of Louis Botha, the commander of the victorious expe-
ditionary force sent to conquer the colony by the Union of South Af-
rica." The thirty-one years of Imperial German rule can be roughly
split up into three phases. During the first phase, lasting from 1884
until 1890, the German Empire strove to keep its commitment to the
new colony to a minimum. Following the example of "Royal Charters"
given by the British Empire, all administrative matters were laid in
the hands of privately owned and funded "colonial companies," which
were tasked with providing the infrastructure and administration nec-
essary for prolonged settlement in return for freedom in exploiting the
resources of the new territories.2 3 However, these plans did not come
to fruition, as the newly founded companies lacked capital and largely
remained inactive.2 4
The Imperial Government decided in 1890-mainly for reasons
of international prestige-to deploy troops, quell the uprisings, and
take control of the administration itself when an insurgency of local
tribesmen forced the German Empire to either reinforce or abandon
the colony.2" Colonial growth was steady, although slow and predomi-
nantly contingent on cattle-farming, as the large deposits of natural
resources remained undetected.2" The end of this second phase is
marked by the uprisings of the Nama and Herero tribes from 1904 un-
til 1907. German colonial troops brutally repelled these uprisings,
changing the relationship between the indigenous inhabitants of
Southwest Africa and the German oppressors.2 7
The defining moment for economic breakthrough marks the be-
ginning of the third phase. In 1908, a railway worker, Zacharias
Lewala, found what he called a "moi klip" (beautiful stone) near the
town of Luideritzbucht, which his German supervisor August Stauch at
21 Martin Cai Lockert, Entwicklung und Kontinuitdt des namibischen Rechtssys-
tems von der deutschen Kolonialzeit bis zur Unabhdngigkeit Namibias am Beispiel
des Bergrechts 45 (2013) (Ph.D. dissertation, Universitat Miinster) (Peter Lang
Verlag, Frankfurt am Main, 2014); KAULICH, supra note 21, at 52-54.
22 Declaration of Khorab, July 9th 1915; see MICHAEL SILAGI, VON DEUTSCH-
SODWEST ZU NAMIBIA: WESEN UND WANDLUNGEN DES VOLKERRECHTLICHEN
MANDATS 142-44 (1977).
23 KAULICH, supra note 20, at 281.
24 Lockert, supra note 21, at 47.
25 ESTERHUYSE, supra note 20, at 145-47.
26 See Dugard, supra note 4.
27 KAULICH, supra note 20, at 247-67.
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once recognized as a diamond.2 ' This discovery started a diamond rush
of unparalleled proportions. Between 1908 and 1913, 4.7 million carats
of diamonds worth 150 million Reichsmark were mined in Southwest
Africa, equaling one-fifth the mass and one-quarter of the worth of
worldwide diamond production. 29 The sudden prospect of wealth at-
tracted an influx of new settlers and fostered economic growth. Taxes
and royalties payable on diamonds also enabled the administration of
the colony to almost fully30 sustain itself financially, greatly heighten-
ing its degree of independence from the German Empire.3"
All ambitions of the colony to further emancipate itself from
the German Empire were cut short in January 1915, when the Union
of South Africa invaded German Southwest Africa.3 2 While the Union
of South Africa officially did so as a Dominion of the British Empire at
the behest of the Crown, other reasons may include the perceived
threat to South Africa's territorial integrity and the urge to claim the
rich Southwest African diamond fields as spoils of war.33
2. Introduction of German Law
a) Sources of German Colonial Law
(1) Schutzvertrdge
The first trace of German colonial law in Southwest Africa is
purely contractual in nature. The so-called Schutzvertrdge (protection
contracts), entered into with indigenous chieftains-first by German
merchant Adolf Luideritz, and, later by emissaries of the German Em-
pire-laid the basis for German sovereignty in Southwest Africa. 34
Through these contracts-the formal basis for which often was either
the conveyance of land or the granting of mining rights-the chieftains
surrendered their sovereignty to the German Empire which in turn
offered protection and agreed to refrain from trifling with the purely
indigenous affairs of the tribes.3 ' By 1894, almost all the tribes of
28 Lisa Kuntze, Die grofe Zeit der Diamantenfunde, in VOM SCHUTZGEBIET BIS
NAMIBIA 2000, at 431-32 (2002).
29 BERND LANGIN, DIE DEUTSCHEN KOLONIEN: SCHAUPLATZE UND SCHICKSALE 1884-
1918, at 149 (2005); OsKAR HINTRAGER, SUDWESTAFRIKA IN DER DEUTSCHEN ZEIT
177 (1956).
30 With the exemption of the costs for the upkeep of the Schutztruppe (colonial
military forces).
31 KAULICH, supra note 20, at 191-97.
32 See Dugard, supra note 4.
33 Lockert, supra note 21, at 66-67.
34 Id. at 50-52.
35 See id. at 51, n.79 (discussing further examples).
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Southwest Africa had entered into such contracts with the German
Empire. 6
(2) Imperial Constitutional Law
In the German Imperial Constitution (Reichsverfassung) of
April 16, 1871, 37 the only references relating to colonization are found
in Article 4. While Article 4 gave the Imperial Government jurisdiction
for all colonial matters, including emigration to "non-German coun-
tries," and provided the legal basis for consular representation abroad,
the legal status of German colonies remained shrouded in uncertainty.
It should not come as a surprise that the exact legal nature of
German colonies at the time was highly controversial.3 s While most
jurists held that colonies did not fall under the jurisdiction of the Im-
perial Constitution, which restricted itself to the area of the German
Empire as positively defined in Article 2, they could not agree on the
question of whether the colonies could legally be seen as territorial ex-
tensions of Germany, or whether instead they had to be compared to
sovereign, foreign nations.3 9 While courts assessed the legal nature of
German colonies on a case-by-case basis when necessary, the dispute
remained theoretical in nature. Even with different reasoning, none of
the various schools of thought denied the Empire its power to rule.4 °
(3) Protectorates Law
On April 17, 1886, the Reichstag4 1 of the German Empire en-
acted the Gesetz, betreffend die Rechtsverhdltnisse in den deutschen
Schutzgebieten (law relating to the legal status of the protectorates).
This law, which was subject to numerous amendments and re-enact-
36 ESTERHUYSE, supra note 20, at 98-101.
37 VERFASSUNG DES DEUTSCHEN REICHS [Constitution of the German Reich], Apr.
16, 1871, REICHSGESETZBLATT [RGBL.] 63 (Ger.).
38 See Daniel Halberstam, Of Power and Responsibility: The Political Morality of
Federal Systems, 90 VA. L. REV. 731, 740 (2004).
39 FRANz FLORACK, DIE SCHUTZGEBIETE, IHRE ORGANISATION IN VERFASSUNG UND
VERWALTUNG 14-16 (1905); ERICH BAUERFELD, VERORDNUNGSGEWALT IN DEN DEUT-
SCHEN SCHUTZGEBIETEN 26-28 (1917).
40 H. EDLER VON HOFFMAN, EINFCTHRUNG IN DAS DEUTSCHE KOLONIALRECHT 7-21
(Goschen'sche Verlagshandlung ed. 1907); see also Lockert, supra note 22, at 52.
41 The legislative body of the German Empire.
42 Gesetz, betreffend die Rechtsverhaltnisse in den deutschen Schutzgebieten
[Law Relating to the Legal Status of the Protectorates], Apr. 17, 1886, REICH-
SGESETZBLATT [RGBL.] at 71 (Ger.).
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ments, was subsequently relabeled Schutzgebietsgesetz (protectorates
law) in 1900.4 1
Section 1 of the Schutzgebietsgesetz transferred the newly
coined term Schutzgewalt (power to protect) to the German Emperor. 44
While, in accordance with the original German plans to leave internal
administration in the hands of private entities, legal science at first
deemed this power to only relate to the repulsion of external threats
posed by third countries, at the outbreak of the 1904 uprisings it was
unanimously agreed that the Schutzgewalt equaled full sovereignty. 45
(4) Imperial Ordinances
The German Emperor (Kaiser) exercised the Schutzgewalt
through ordinances (Verordnungen).4' The German Emperor deferred
this power in part to the Imperial Chancellor and the Imperial Colo-
nial Administration.4 7 Apart from this derivative power, the different
iterations of the Schutzgebietsgesetz also provided the Imperial Chan-
cellor with powers to enact ordinances "where necessary for the execu-
tion of the law."4" While this provision contradicted the notion of the
Schutzgewalt of the German Emperor to be all-encompassing in the-
ory, the supreme rule of the Emperor remained unchallenged in
practice.4 9
b) Transferring German Statutory Law
A two-fold reference introduced German civil and criminal
statutory law into the colony. In Section 2,50 the Schutzgebietsgesetz
referred to the provisions of the Konsulargerichtsbarkeitsgesetz of July
10, 1879.
This law regulated the use of German statutory law for Ger-
man expatriates. Its application in a third country was usually depen-
43 See Lockert, supra note 21, at 52, n.83-86 (listing all amendments and re-enact-
ments). The last iteration of the law came into effect on July 22nd, 1913. For ease
of reading, this article uses the term Schutzgebietsgesetz for reference henceforth.
44 Schutzgebietsgesetz von 1886 [SchGG] [Reserve Act], Apr. 17, 1886, REICH-
SGESETZBLATT [RGBL.] at 75, § 1, last amended by Schutzgebietsgesetz von 1900
[SchGG], Sept. 10, 1900, RGBL. at 812 (Ger.).
45 BAUERFELD, supra note 39, at 34.
46 See Lockert, supra note 21, at 55.
47 Id.
48 See id. at 54 n.101.
49 BAUERFELD, supra note 39, at 66.
50 Section 3 in the re-enactment of the Schutzgebietsgesetz of September 10th
1900. See Schutzgebietsgesetz von 1900 [SchGG] [Reserve Act], Sept. 10, 1900,
RGBL. at S. 812 at § 3 (Ger.).
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dent on a bi-lateral contract. 51 According to Sections 3 and 452 of the
Konsulargerichtsbarkeitsgesetz, all German statutes relating to civil
law and criminal law were applicable to German citizens and persons
declared to be equal by ordinance of the Imperial Chancellor.5 3 The
Schutzgebietsgesetz generalized this application insofar as Section 254
declared these provisions applicable to everybody within the colony-
with the exception of all indigenous people.55
Whereas the criminal law was introduced in full, all other Ger-
man laws had to be checked as to whether they should be classified as
public or civil law. This is because the introduction of the German civil
law was not tied to a specific group of statutory laws, but relied solely
on the nature of each single regulation or rule of law in the whole body
of German statutory law. 56
3. Evaluation
It is debatable whether the transfer of German civil and crimi-
nal law to the newly founded Southwest African colony can be labeled
as a legal transplant at all, or whether it just constitutes a "natural"
extension of German law into new German territories. From a factual
point of view, one might argue that theory, as the executive and legis-
lative powers effectively share nation of origin or the "donor nation"
(the German Empire) and the "host nation" (the Southwest African col-
ony). The legal perspective, however, contradicts this assumption: the
Imperial Constitution made it clear that colonies did not directly fall
under its jurisdiction. Hence, the legal nature of newly founded colo-
nies remained, at best, unclear.
The German Empire was presented with the task of providing
a legal system for the colony while facing two major restrictions: the
absence of almost all legal or administrative institutions and the ne-
cessity for utmost flexibility in reacting to the challenges and changes
encountered in the new territory. While the first obstacle could have
been circumvented by instrumentalizing the provisions of the Konsu-
largerichtsbarkeitsgesetz alone, which in itself provided a simplified
framework for administering German law abroad through an ap-
51 Konsulargerichtsbarkeitsgesetz [Law on Consular], July 10, 1879, REICH-
SGESETZBLATT [RGBL.] at 197-206, § 1, last amended by Gesetz fiber die Konsu-
largerichtsbarkeit, Apr. 7, 1900, RGBL. at 213-28 (Ger.).
52 Sections 2(2), 19 in the re-enactment of the Konsulargerichtsbarkeitsgesetz of
April 7th 1900. See Gesetz uiber die Konsulargerichtsbarkeit [Law on Consular
Jurisdiction], Apr. 7, 1900, RGBL. at §§ 2(2), 19 (Ger.).
53 See Konsulargerichtsbarkeitsgesetz, supra note 51, at 213-28, § 3-4.
54 See Schutzgebietsgesetz von 1900, supra note 50, §§ 3, 4.
55 See Schutzgebietsgesetz von 1886, supra note 44, § 2.
56 HOFFMAN, supra note 40, at 107.
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pointed consul, 7 the latter restriction-although mainly a question of
public law-required an additional means to tweak and adjust the ma-
terial civil law where needed. Rather than focusing on alterations of
single statutes, the Schutzgebietsgesetz provided a framework which
altered or added to the German civil law statutes where required and
also allowed for on-the-spot adjustments through executive
ordinances.
For example, provisions of the Schutzgebietsgesetz for Koloni-
algesellschaften (colonial companies) supplemented German company
law5" had not been known to German company law before. These com-
panies enjoyed relative freedom from the restrictions otherwise im-
posed by German company law.5 9 In addition, apart from the German
Emperor's all-encompassing Schutzgewalt,6 ° the Schutzgebietsgesetz
also provided the Imperial Chancellor with jurisdiction to amend all
laws for colonial use through ordinances.6 1
Notwithstanding the classification or definition of the act of
transferring the law itself as a transplant or a simple extension, some
contend that by filtering the implementation of German civil (and
criminal) law through the provisions of the Schutzgebietsgesetz and
Konsulargerichtsbarkeitsgesetz, an attempt at customization or adap-
tation was made.
4. Conflicts
The potential for conflict was limited insofar as the German
Empire transferred civil and criminal law of the German Empire as a
whole. The customization through Schutzgebietsgesetz and Konsu-
largerichtsbarkeitsgesetz merely added to this coherent system. The
Konsulargerichtsbarkeitsgesetz made a clear reference to the civil law
in force in the German Empire.6 2 Thus, all changes made by Imperial
German legislation were automatically applicable in the colony unless
specific colonial ordinances enacted by the Emperor or Imperial Chan-
cellor stated otherwise.
57 Compare sections 4-18 of the Konsulargerichtsbarkeitsgesetz. Konsulargericht-
sbarkeitsgesetz, supra note 51, §§ 4-18. Also, under these regulations, the Impe-
rial Chancellor acted as a substitute for every other German government agency.
BAUERFELD, supra note 39, at 70; See Lockert, supra note 21, at 55.
58 See Schutzgebietsgesetz von 1900, supra note 50, at § 11.
59 Especially relating to the mandatory capital base of companies. See HOFFMAN,
supra note 41, at 110-111; Lockert, supra note 21, at 63-64.
60 Schutzgebietsgesetz von 1886, supra note 44, § 1.
61 See supra Part III. A. 2. a) (4).
62 Konsulargerichtsbarkeitsgesetz, supra note 51, § 3; Gesetz iber die Konsu-
largerichtsbarkeit, supra note 52, § 2(2), 19.
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However, we can see cause for conflict in the ambiguity of this
jurisdiction. The central term Schutzgewalt in section 1 of the
Schutzgebietsgesetz was not positively defined, but was instead open to
legal interpretation. 3 The letter of the law extended this jurisdiction
to both the Emperor as well as the Imperial Chancellor, without pro-
viding a binding method for dissolving possible conflicts. Also, as the
legal nature of the colonies remained vague, it remained legally unpre-
dictable as to whether the constitutional hierarchies of the German
Empire were also applicable in the colony.
Finally, the provisions of Schutzgebietsgesetz and Konsularger-
ichtsbarkeitsgesetz did not provide for a resolution where subsequent
civil or criminal legislation of the German Reichstag contradicted
amendments or addendums made by prior colonial ordinances of ei-
ther the Emperor or the Imperial Chancellor.6 4
5. Summary
In transferring the body of civil and criminal law to the new
colony and allowing for a degree of customization, the German Empire
set up a framework with the Schutzgebietsgesetz. The Schutzgebiet-
sgesetz, in turn, drew on the Konsulargerichtsbarkeitsgesetz as a sys-
tem for bringing German law to subjects abroad already in place.
This setup was cohesive, as it kept the transferred bodies of
law connected to the legislation of the German Empire as the country
of origin. The methods for customization were practical and allowed
for quick, functional, and advantageous adaption to the needs of a
newly founded colony. At first, the German Empire defined these
needs. While the colony was subsequently granted more and more au-
tonomy and rights of self-governance, World War I abruptly cut short
the process of emancipation.6 5 Because of this, the political struggle of
turning over the tools for customization from the Emperor and Impe-
rial Chancellor to a local administration, which was sparked by Impe-
rial mining legislation and diamond taxation (and in 1914 had just
begun being fought), was not essential.6 6
On a jurisprudential level, the framework for customization
displayed various shortcomings. While German constitutional law is
responsible for the lack of a definition of the legal status of colonies,
the overlapping competencies between Emperor, Imperial Chancellor,
and the Imperial legislation of the Reichstag are manifest in the
Schutzgebietsgesetz. As all legal ambiguities were always resolved in
63 See Schutzgebietsgesetz von 1900, supra note 50, § 1.
64 See id.; Konsulargerichtsbarkeitsgesetz, supra note 51.
65 See Lockert, supra note 21, at 57-59.
66 See id. at 59, 185-93.
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favor of the Emperor in practice,6 7 possible conflicts posed by these
inaccuracies never surfaced.
B. South African Mandate and Occupancy
1. Historical Overview
After the outbreak of World War I, the Union of South Africa
fielded an expeditionary force of 50,000 men and invaded German
Southwest-Africa, where it faced less than 5,000 German troops.6" The
Union troops were victorious during hostilities drawn out until May
1915. These hostilities were due to an uprising among the mainly
Boer69 soldiers of the Union army and various tactical retreats of the
German defenders.7 ° The Treaty of Khorab of July 9th, 1915, estab-
lished a South African Military Governorate in the former German col-
ony, which was now officially called the Protectorate of Southwest-
Africa. While German soldiers were interned and all traces of German
administration were disestablished,7 1 German civilian life remained
largely untouched. 72 Like German colonial influence, the South Afri-
can period in Southwest-African history can be roughly split up into
three phases. These are discussed in subsequent paragraphs.
When World War I was coming to an end, it was foreseeable
that the South African influence in Southwest-Africa would be perpet-
uated. While South Africa originally strived to annex Southwest-Af-
rica as a fifth province, the proposal of administering the territories of
the Axis powers through a newly incorporated League of Nations
gained the support of South Africa when presented by United States
President Woodrow Wilson in 1917.13 After the Peace Treaty of Ver-
sailles established the League of Nations on January 10th, 1920, the
League required South Africa to administer the territory of Southwest-
67 See BAUERFELD, supra note 39, at 66.
68 Germans Surrender Southwest Africa to Union of South Africa, HISTORY. http://
www.history.com/this-day-in-history/germans-surrender-southwest-africa-to-
union-of-south-africa (last visited Mar. 17, 2014).
69 The term refers to the self-proclaimed name of the original Dutch settlers in
South Africa. The revolt against the British elite can mainly be attributed to Boer
sympathies for their German neighbors, who supported the Boer population dur-
ing the Boer Wars (1899-1902), which the Boers lost to the British. See Lockert,
supra note 21, at 66-67.
70 See id. at 65-68.
71 Exempting the police force. See id. at 67.
72 For example, attorneys were allowed to continue their practice, with German
still being considered an official language in court. See id. at 71-72.
73 See MICHAEL SILAGI, VON DEUTSCH-SuDWEST zu NAMIBIA 22-48 (1977).
186 RICHMOND JOURNAL OF GLOBAL LAW & BUSINESS [Vol. 13:2
Africa7" on December 17th, 1920. 71 Article 2 of this so-called C-Man-
date76 gave South Africa full administrative and legislative powers.
The economic growth of the Mandate largely relied on diamond
mining, which developed into a high-technology industry and a main-
stay of the economy, making up between 45% and 60% of the South-
west-African export volume from 1920 to 1930.11 Though heavily
consolidated in the aftermath of the world-wide economic crisis of
1931, which led to a downfall of diamond mining to just 5% of the ex-
port volume, the quota stabilized between 10% and 25% in the late
1930s.7 s
The outbreak of World War II heralded a second phase, which
refueled the original intentions of South Africa to fully annex South-
west-Africa. The Southwest-African Legislative Assembly7 9 unani-
mously voted for integration into the Union of South Africa as a fifth
province in 1943, South African Prime Minister Smuts proclaimed
that he considered the Mandate of the League of Nations to have come
to an end and that Southwest-Africa would be annexed after necessary
negotiations with member states of the League of Nations had been
held.s ° This proposed annexation did not take place. Instead, after the
founding of the United Nations on October 24th, 1945, South Africa
was asked-and expected-to place Southwest-Africa under the ad-
ministration of the International Trusteeship System created by
Chapters XII and XIII of the Charter of the United Nations in 1946.81
After the United Nations turned down an official request by the Union
of South Africa to fully annex Southwest-Africa, South Africa refused
to recognize the new Trusteeship System and sought to uphold the sta-
tus quo and administer Southwest-Africa "in the spirit of the League of
Nations-mandate."s2
As a result, the conflict escalated from a political to a legal
level, when the International Court of Justice was tasked with deter-
74 See The Covenant of the League of Nations, art. 22, para. 5-6.
75 See Lockert, supra note 21, at 68-71.
76 See SILAGI, supra note 73, at 148-50.
77 Gabi Schneider, Die Verborgenen Schdtze - der Bergbau, in VOM SCHUTZGEBIET
Bis NAMIBIA 253 (Klaus Hess & Klaus Becker eds., Gottingen: Klaus Hess Verlag
2000).
78 Id. at 254.
79 The legislative body of the Territory of Southwest-Africa. See Lockert, supra
note 21, at 89-90.
80 ANDRE Du PISANI, SWAfNAMIBIA: THE POLITICS AND CONTINUITY OF CHANGE 85
(1986).s3 See Lockert, supra note 21, at 73-75.
82 THE SOUTH WEST AFRICA/NAMIBIA DISPUTE: DOCUMENTS AND SCHOLARLY WRIT-
INGS ON THE CONTROVERSY BETWEEN SOUTH AFRICA AND THE UNITED NATIONS 89-
96, 104-112 (John Dugard, ed., University of California Press, 1973).
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mining the legal status of Southwest-Africa in 1949, and held that
South Africa could not be forced to place Southwest-Africa under the
Trusteeship System itself. They obligated South Africa to fulfill the
obligations incurred by the C-Mandate to the United Nations as suc-
cessor to the League of Nations. s 3 In 1960, the United Nations backed
two former members of the League of Nations, Ethiopia and Liberia, in
their lawsuit against the Union of South Africa for violating the provi-
sions of this Mandate through promotion of racial inequality in its ad-
ministration of Southwest-Africa. 4
The Odendaal-Report provided for the introduction of
Apartheid into Southwest-Africa-the racial segregation already prac-
ticed in South Africa-and this segregation took place in 1964.85 This
report advocated the administrative reorganization of the territory
into ethnically divided areas and henceforth constituted the basis for
all political and economic decisions made by South Africa for South-
west-Africa until 1975.86
Economically, Southwest-Africa continued to rely on diamond
mining as its backbone. Beginning in 1961, new maritime mining tech-
niques, through which diamonds could also be extracted from the
shoreline and the seabed on an industrial scale, led to record results.8 7
While the mining of non-precious base minerals stagnated in the late
1960s, the mining of uranium, which was taken up in 1973 in the
Rdssing-Mine (one of the world's largest opencast pits near
Swakopmund), added to the economic importance of the mining
sector.88
The legal action of the United Nations turned out to be unsuc-
cessful on July 18th, 1966, when the International Court of Justice
held in one of its most controversial decisions that both Ethiopia and
Liberia lacked the power to sue.8 9 As a reaction to the implementation
of the Apartheid system and the failure of the lawsuit, the positive
outcome of which the United Nations had relied on for their future
plans for Southwest-Africa, the General Assembly of the United Na-
tions terminated the South African Mandate through Resolution 2145
(XXI) on October 27th 1966:
The General Assembly, ...
83 International Status of South West Africa, Advisory Opinion, 1950 I.C.J. 128
(July 11); See generally SILAGI, supra note 73.
84 Du PISANI, supra note 80, at 140.
85 Dugard, supra note 82, at 236.
86 Du PISANI, supra note 80, at 161-63.
87 Schneider, supra note 77, at 229-45.
88 See Lockert, supra note 21, at 225-26.
9 South West Africa Cases, Advisory Opinion, 1966 I.C.J. 4 (July 18); see Dugard,
supra note 82, at 292-324.
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1) Reaffirms ... the people of South West Africa have
the inalienable right to self-determination, freedom
and independence in accordance with the Charter of
the United Nations;
2) Reaffirms further that South West Africa is a terri-
tory having international status and that it shall
maintain this status until it achieves independence;
3) Declares that South Africa has failed to fulfill its ob-
ligations in respect of the administration of the Man-
dated Territory and to ensure the moral and
material well-being and security of the indigenous
inhabitants of South West Africa and has, in fact,
disavowed the Mandate;
4) Decides that the Mandate conferred upon His Bri-
tannic Majesty to be exercised on his behalf by the
Government of the Union of South Africa is therefore
terminated, that South Africa has no other right to
administer the Territory and that henceforth South
West Africa comes under direct responsibility of the
United Nations. °
A third phase began with the armed resistance of the indige-
nous South West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO) on August
26th, 1968.91 The General Assembly of the United Nations explicitly
approved of this struggle.9 2 Also, as a sign of support, the General As-
sembly officially re-labeled Southwest-Africa "Namibia," a term hith-
erto exclusively used by SWAPO.9 '
South Africa, at first, blocked all attempts by the United Na-
tions to politically defuse the situation. South Africa gave up its goal of
fully annexing Southwest-Africa and agreed to set foot on a path that
would eventually lead to Namibian independence only in the mid-
1970s, when the various international sanctions called for by the
United Nations Security Council took effect and the guerrilla struggle
of SWAPO was backed by communist countries and turned into a Cold
War proxy-conflict.9 4 These plans, which were subsequently laid out in
United Nations Security Council Resolution 435 of September 29th,
90 U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., 1454th plen. mtg, at 2, U.N. Doc. A/RES/2145(XXI)
(Oct. 27, 1966).91 See Lockert, supra note 21, at 78-79.
92 U.N. GAOR 26th Sess., 2028th plen. mtg. at 1, U.N. Doc. A/RES/2871 (Dec. 20,
1971).
93 Namibia is an artificial word, based on the Namib desert in the west of the
country. U.N. GAOR 22nd Sess., 1671st plen. mtg. at 1, U.N. Doc. A/RES/2372
(June 12, 1968).
94 See Lockert, supra note 21, at 78-81.
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1978, called for free elections supervised by an United Nations Transi-
tion Assistance Group (UNTAG) and a Special Representative.9 5
In order to prepare Southwest-Africa for these elections, South
Africa once again tightened its administrative grip on the territory.
The execution of Resolution 435 was put to a halt when, in 1980, the
United States government linked their consent to the withdrawal of
Cuban troops from Angola. This fully elevated the conflict to the global
scale of the Cold War.9 6 Accordingly, a solution was only reached in
the course of the Soviet Perestroika in the late 1980s, and free elec-
tions for the Constituent Assembly of Namibia were held from Novem-
ber 7 until November 11, 1989. 9 7
2. Introduction of South African Law
The following part of the article analyses the various sources of
law introduced to Southwest-Africa during the period of South African
occupancy. This analysis does not take into account their-highly con-
troversial 9g-legal validity according to international law, and is
merely focused on the bilateral legal relationships and connections be-
tween South Africa and Southwest-Africa.
a) Constitutional Laws for Southwest-Africa
(1) Martial Law
After the German surrender at Khorab, the Minister of De-
fence of the Union of South Africa proclaimed a Military Governor on
July 11th, 1915, who ruled Southwest-Africa on his behalf under mar-
tial law as follows:
... do hereby appoint you to be Military Governor provi-
sionally throughout the said territory which shall be
known as the South West African Protectorate . . . I do
further authorize and empower you as such Military
Governor, but subject to any instruction which you may
from time to time receive from the Minister of Defence
for the said Union, to take all such measures, and by
proclamation to make such laws, and enforce the same,
as you may deem necessary for the peace, order and good
government of the Protectorate. 9 9
95 The so-called "Namibia-Plan." See Du PISANI, supra note 80, at 335-68.
96 African States Try New Tactics for Namibia Independence, CHRISTIAN SCI. MON-
ITOR (May, 19, 1983) at 2, http://www.csmonitor.com/1983/0519/051943.html
(page)/2.97 See Lockert, supra note 21, at 83-86.
98 See supra Part III. B. 1.
99 Dugard, supra note 82, at 27.
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Through proclamation by the Union Minister of Defence, the
office of Military Governor was subsequently re-labeled as Administra-
tor, and the term Protectorate was substituted by the term Territory of
South West Africa, 0 0
After the end of World War I, the Parliament of the Union of
South Africa-still acting under the provisions of martial law-trans-
ferred all legislative and executive powers from the Territory of South
West Africa to the Governor-General of South Africa in order to pre-
pare for the execution of the Mandate granted to South Africa by the
League of Nations. 1 They, in turn, delegated these rights to the Ad-
ministrator. After the withdrawal of martial law, which was declared
on January 2nd, 192 1,102 all executive and legislative powers were
once again concentrated in the office of the Administrator, who in turn
acted on and was subject to the instructions of the South African Par-
liament and Governor-General. 10 3
(2) South West Africa Constitution Act 1925
The South West African Constitution Act laid out a constitu-
tional basis for the administration of the Territory of South West Af-
rica under the C-Mandate of the League of Nations. The South African
Parliament passed this act in 1925.104 This granted the local white
population limited rights of participation: legislation was partially put
in the hands of an elected Legislative Assembly, while executive pow-
ers were shared by the Administrator and members of an Executive
Committee, who were nominated by the Legislative Assembly. 10 The
South African Parliament and the Governor-General, who at any time
could step in and take over administration of the Territory as a whole,
could overrule all legislative and executive decisions.10 6 Because the
Southwest-African population was not represented in the South Afri-
can Parliament at all, and rights of participation were limited to the
white minority only, this Act did not further the goals of Southwest-
African autonomy set out by the League of Nations Mandate, but in-
stead tightened the grip of white South African supremacy.1 0 7
100 Id.
101 Treaty of Peace and South West Africa Mandate, Act No. 49 of 1919, Union
Gazette of September 19th 1919.
102 Indemnity and Withdrawal of Martial Law, Proclamation No. 1 of 1921, Union
Gazette of January 2nd 1921.
103 See Lockert, supra note 21, at 88-89.
104 Dugard, supra note 82, at 425.
105 See Lockert, supra note 21, at 89-90.
106 South West Africa Constitution Act No. 42 of 1925 (Union), section 44.
107 Du PIsANI, supra note 80, at 71.
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(3) South West Africa Affairs Amendment Act 1949
A major amendment of the South West African Constitution
Act of 1925 took place in 1949,08 when, after the downfall of the
League of Nations and growing conflicts with the newly founded
United Nations, the Union of South Africa shifted its political focus to
the outright annexation of Southwest-Africa in the second phase of the
occupational period. The amendment granted the white population the
right to elect representatives for both Chambers of the South African
Parliament.'0 9 In addition, it extended the jurisdiction of the South-
west-African Legislative Assembly and made exclusive for certain ar-
eas. While the Governor-General lost his power to overrule Southwest-
African legislation in these areas of exclusive jurisdiction, he kept all
administrative powers.1 10 Also, all ordinances by the Legislative As-
sembly were still subject to suspension by Act of the South African
Parliament. '1 1
(4) South West Africa Constitution Act 1968
The new South West African Constitution Act of 1968 repealed
the South West African Constitution Act of 1925 in its amended form
in order to implement the recommendations made by the Odendaal-
Plan. While the provisions regarding the representation of the South-
west-African white minority in the Parliament of the Republic of
South Africa were carried over, the administrative process itself al-
tered the former rights of self-governance in order to accommodate the
incorporation of the ethnically divided homelands or bantustans envi-
sioned by Odendaal. 11 2 While still having a unique role on paper, the
jurisdiction of the Legislative Assembly was further curtailed in favor
of the South African Parliament and the State President, 1 13 thereby
effectively placing it on par with the Provincial Councils of the four
South African provinces. 114 Under the provisions of the South West
Africa Constitution Act of 1968, the territory could rightfully be
108 Dugard, supra note 82, at 120.
109 Id.
110 South West Africa Constitution Act 42 of 1925 as amended by South West Afri-
can Affairs Amendment Act 23 of 1949 § 44 (3)-(4). See Lockert, supra note 22, at
91.
1'1 South West Africa Constitution Act 42 of 1925 as amended by South West Afri-
can Affairs Amendment Act 23 of 1949 § 4(4).
112 Du PIsAI, supra note 80, at 188-89.
113 As successor to the Governor-General as head of the executive after South Af-
rica proclaimed itself a Republic on May 31st, 1961.
114 Werner Bertelsmann, Current Legal Developments in South West Africa, 2
COMP. & INT'L L.J. S.AFR. 3, 338 (1969); see Lockert, supra note 21, at 93.
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claimed to equal a fifth province of South Africa for all administrative
matters, even though it had not been officially annexed.1 1 5
(5) South West Africa Constitution Amendment Act 1977
In the wake of the fundamental change in South African policy
during the third phase of the occupancy, the constitutional setup of
Southwest-Africa was effectively revoked. In preparation for transi-
tioning the territory to independence, all legislative and executive
powers for Southwest-Africa were transferred to the South African
State President, thereby disempowering the South West African Par-
liament.1 1 6 The State President delegated these powers in full to the
newly established office of the Administrator-General for the Territory
of South West Africa.1 17 The Southwest-African Legislative Assembly
and Executive Committee effectively lost jurisdiction and fell back to a
purely advisory role.'
From 1985 until 1989, the newly formed Transitional Govern-
ment of National Unity demoted the Administrator-General to a mere
advisor to the legislative and executive organs. 1 19 South African
supremacy was upheld at all times as this government was established
on behalf and by authority of the South African State President. He
reserved a right to veto all propositions and exempted key elements
such as matters of defense and foreign policy from its jurisdiction.1 2 °
b) Acts, Proclamations, and Ordinances
As shown above, all acts of lawmaking between the German
surrender in Southwest-Africa in 1915 and Namibian independence in
1990 can be traced back to South African authority. They were legally
based on martial law and the provisions of the C-Mandate of the
League of Nations at first. While, during the second and third phase of
the occupancy, South African sovereignty over Southwest-Africa was
subject to highly controversial international debate, it was undisputed
on a practical level.
115 Du PisANi, supra note 80, at 189; Bertelsmann, supra note 114, at 337-38.
116 South West Africa Constitution Act 39 of 1968, as amended by the South West
African Constitution Amendment Act 95 of 1977 § 38 (1).
117 Establishment of Office of Administrator-General for the Territory of South
West Africa Proclamation No. 180 of 1977, August 18th 1977; Empowering of the
Administrator-General for the Territory of South West Africa to Make Laws Proc-
lamation No. 181 of 1977, August 18th 1977 (Sw. Afr.)
118 Du PisAi, supra note 80, at 430-31.
119 South West Africa Legislative and Executive Authority Establishment Procla-
mation No. R 101 of June 17th, 1985.
120 See Lockert, supra note 21, at 93-95.
2014] TRANSPLANTING AND CUSTOMIZING LEGAL SYSTEMS 193
Legislation in and for Southwest-Africa has largely been a com-
bined effort between the South African Parliament and Governor-Gen-
eral, on one side, and the appointed Administrator and Southwest-
African Legislative Assembly on the other.12 1 The highest and most
important sources of law were the Acts passed by both Chambers of
the South African Parliament. Up until the appointment of the Admin-
istrator-General in 1977, these Acts formed the premiere law of South-
west-Africa, followed by the Proclamations issued by the
representatives of the South African executive and their Southwest-
African proxies. 12 2 The Ordinances issued by the Southwest-African
legislature within its limited jurisdiction were subordinate to these
sources of law, as they were largely dependent on the approval of the
executive and subordinate to the Acts of the South African
Parliament. 123
c) Introduction of Roman-Dutch Law
After the end of World War I, the South African administration
decided to introduce the common law of South Africa to Southwest-
Africa as the new law of the land after a prolonged South African en-
gagement in Southwest-Africa became foreseeable while negotiating
the Peace Treaty of Versailles and the foundation of the League of
Nations.
The Administrator introduced Roman-Dutch Law as practiced
in the South African Cape Province through the Administration of Jus-
tice Proclamation No. 21 of 1919, 124 section 1 of which reads as follows:
(1) The Roman Dutch Law as existing and applied in
the Province of the Cape of Good Hope at the date of
the coming into effect of this Proclamation shall,
from and after the said date, be the Common Law of
the Protectorate, and all Laws within the Protector-
ate in conflict therewith shall, to the extent of such
conflict and subject to the provisions of this Section,
be repealed.
(2) Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph (1) of
this Section, all Proclamations which have been is-
sued during the Military occupation of the Protec-
torate and are still in force on the said date shall
continue to be in force.
(3) All rights, privileges, obligations or liabilities ac-
quired, accrued or incurred prior to the said date
121 Id.
122 Id.
123 See Lockert, sapra note 21, at 95-96.
124 Administration of Justice Proclamation No. 21 of 1919, (GG) (S. Afr).
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shall be determined according to the law in force in
the Protectorate at the time of acquisition, accrual
or incurrence. ' 12 5
The introduction came into effect on January 1st, 1920.126 In order to
assess if and to what extent this implementation can be considered a
legal transplant and what types of problems and conflicts were posed
by its adaptation, a historical overview 1 27 of the development of Ro-
man-Dutch Law and its inception in South Africa will be followed by
an in-depth look at the range and scope of its introduction to South-
west-Africa.
(1) Historical Overview12
(a) Reception of Roman Law in Holland
Academic studies of Roman law in medieval Europe started in
the 11th century in Bologna, when scholars-the so-called "glossa-
tors"-started to add commentaries and explanations to the Corpus
Iuris Civilis. After this practice had spread to various universities in
northern Italy and southern France in the following centuries, the so-
called "postglossators" or "commentators" started to adapt these rules
of Roman Law to the contemporary practical needs of the 14th cen-
tury.129 As a result, even without official reception, Roman laws per-
meated the local laws of large parts of Europe. Such an official
reception subsequently took place in 1495, when the Holy Roman Em-
pire, which saw itself as the successor to the Roman Empire, installed
the Roman law as adapted by the "glossators" and "commentators" as
the subsidiary law of the land in the Reichskammergericht-
sordnung.130 The area of this reception included the seven provinces of
the Netherlands, which at the time were part of the Holy Roman Em-
pire.1 31 After having been intermixed with the existing Germanic law,
this new form of Roman law was called usus modernus
pandectarum. 132
The term Roman-Dutch Law refers to the amalgamation of Ro-
man law as received in medieval Europe and the Germanic common
125 Id.
126 Id. § 16.
127 See H.R. HAHLO & ELLISON KAHN, THE SOUTH AFRICAN LEGAL SYSTEM AND ITS
BACKGROUND (1968); LOURENS MARTHINUS Du PLESSIS, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW
16 (2ND ED. 1995).
128 See Lockert, supra note 21, at 97-105.
129 id.
130 HAHLO & KAHN, supra note 127, at 503; FRANz WIEACKER, VOM ROMISCHEN
RECHT. WIRKLICHKEIT UND tIBERLIEFERUNG 222-51.
131 HAHLO & KAHN, supra note 127, at 515-16.
132 AMOO, supra note 19, at 91; WIEACKER supra note 130, at 252-66.
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law,13 3 which was used in the Dutch province of Holland in the 17th
and 18th century. 134 Contemporary sources of law are not only the
statutes of the province of Holland (so-called Placaaten, Ordonnantien,
and Diplomata), but also collections of decisions (Observationes), opin-
ions and expertises (Consultatien), which originally got compiled by
judges and jurists for unofficial personal use. 13 5 By far, the biggest in-
fluence on the legal practices in court have (and still is today) been
attributed to the books and treatises of contemporary legal scholars,
who tried to systematically summarize the law for the sake of practical
manageability.1 3 6
The most influential of these works is the textbook "Inleiding
tot de Hollandsche Rechtsgeleertheyd" by Hugo Grotius (1583-1645),
which was published in 1631 and was first to portray the connection
between Roman and Dutch law as a legal system in its own right,
rather than depicting the Dutch parts as mere addendums to a Roman
code of law.137 It still is considered to be the unofficial codification of
Roman-Dutch Law and is frequently cited in modern legal practice.1 38
Another such book of continuing legal importance is the "Com-
mentarius ad pandectas" by Johannes Voet (1647-1713), published in
1698 (Vol. I) and 1704 (Vol. II.), which contains an extensive commen-
tary on all fifty books of the Digest, followed up by a description of
contemporary Dutch law.1 39
(b) Reception of Roman-Dutch Law in South Africa
On March 20th, 1602, four rival shipping companies banded
together and formed the Dutch East India Company (the Vereenigde
Ooost-Indische Compagnie or "V.O.C."). 4 ° The V.O.C. was based in
the province of Holland and had been granted far-reaching trade-
133 See J.T.R. GIBSON, WILLE'S PINCIPLES OF SOUTH AFRICAN LAW 23-24 (1977).
134 HAHLO & KAHN, supra note 127, at 329.
135 Id. at 543-48; REINHARD ZIMMERMANN, DAS ROMISCH-HOLLANDISCHE RECHT IN
SUDAFRIKA. EINFUHRUNG IN DIE GRUNDLAGEN UND Usus HODIERNUS 59 (1983)
[hereinafter Zimmerman 1]; GIBSON, supra note 133, at 25-27.
136 HAHLO & KAHN, supra note 127, at 548-62; Zimmermann 1, supra note 135, at
58-62; see REINHARD ZIMMERMANN, ROMISCH-HOLLANDISCHES RECHT - EIN tBER-
BLICK 26-49 (Robert Feenstra & Reinhard Zimmermann eds., 1992) (providing a
description of the seven most important authors and their works) [hereinafter
Zimmermann 2]
137 GIBSON, supra note 133, at 21; Zimmermann 2, supra note 136 at 29-30.
138 HEIN KOTZ & KONRAD ZWEIGERT, AN INTRODUCTION TO COMPARATIVE LAW 234
(3rd ed. 1996).
139 HAHLO & KAHN, supra note 127, at 556-57; GIBSON supra note 133, at 28; Zim-
mermann 1, supra note 135, at 60.
140 Vereenigde Nederlandsche Geoctroyeerde Oost-Indische Compagnie, abbrevi-
ated V.O.C.
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rights and even a limited degree of sovereignty by the government of
the United Netherlands (the so-called Staten-Generaal). This sover-
eignty allowed the V.O.C. to found and administer new outposts and
colonies abroad."' On April 6th, 1652, Dutch merchant Jan van
Riebeeck arrived at the Cape of Good Hope and built an outpost on
behalf of the V.O.C. in order to provide supplies to the company's ships
en route to India. 14 2
As a result of a directive of the Directorate of the V.O.C. dating
back to 1621, the Roman-Dutch Law as practiced in the Province of
Holland was introduced as the law of the new outpost. 143 The authori-
ties of the V.O.C. regulated local matters through the use of ordi-
nances (Placaaten), which-according to the economic nature of the
enterprise-were singularly focused on providing a stable environ-
ment for the ongoing trade operations. 144
From a legal point of view, the validity of both the directive of
1621 and the ordinances of local V.O.C. authorities is questionable, as
the original rights granted to the V.O.C. by the Staten-Generaal in
1602 did include the right to install courts of law, but explicitly ex-
cluded legislative powers. 1 4 5 However, given the scope of this article,
this question can remain unanswered because the introduction of Ro-
man-Dutch Law to Southwest-Africa does have a valid basis in the Ad-
ministration of Justice Proclamation No. 21 of 1919, issued under
martial law.146
In the 19th century, Roman-Dutch Law was carried from the
Cape Colony to the newly founded Boer-Republics of Transvaal, Natal,
and the Orange Free State by the migrating Trekboers.1 4 7
141 OSKAR HINTRAGER, GESCHICHTE VON SUDAFRIKA 27 (1952).
142 SOUTH AFRICAN HISTORY ONLINE, The Arrival of Jan Van Riebeeck in the Cape-
6 April 1652, http://www.sahistory.org.za/topic/arrival-jan-van-riebeeck-cape-6-
april-1652.
143 HAHLO & KAHN, supra note 127, at 572 (the Province of Holland was chosen for
its economic importance and because the V.O.C. was headquartered in
Amsterdam).
144 Eduard Fagan, Roman-Dutch Law in its South African Historical Context, in
SOUTHERN CROSS. CIVIL LAW AND COMMON LAW IN SOUTH AFRICA 47 (Daniel Visser
& Reinhard Zimmermann eds., 1996); Zimmermann 1, supra note 135, at 3.
145 Zimmermann 1, supra note 135, at 4; Fagan, supra note 144, at 38-39.
146 See Administration of Justice Proclamation No. 21 of 1919, (GG) (S. Mr.).
147 HAHLO & KAHN, supra note 127, at 575-76.
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(c) British Influences on South African Roman-Dutch Law
From 1795 until the formation of the Union of South Africa in
1910, the British Empire ruled the Cape Colony and large parts of
southern Africa.1 4 8
After a slow and steady decline, the V.O.C. declared bank-
ruptcy in 1794.149 In order to withdraw it from the grasp of Napoleon,
the government of the Netherlands agreed to allow the British Empire
to occupy the Cape Colony from 1795 to 1803. In 1806, the Napoleonic
Wars took on a trans-continental dimension and the British Empire
once again 150 took control of the Cape Colony as a means of protecting
the sea routes along the Cape of Good Hope. 1 5 ' After the end of the
Napoleonic Wars, the British government decided to maintain its pres-
ence at the Cape, promote immigration, and transform the Colony into
an integral part of the British Empire. 1 52
According to contemporary colonial policy, 153 the British Em-
pire did not substitute the local law in the Cape Colony with its own
common law but kept the prevailing Roman-Dutch Law as the law of
the land.' As a result, Roman-Dutch Law continued to apply in the
Cape Colony, even when its country of origin, the Netherlands, aban-
doned the implementation of the Napoleonic Code Civil in 1811.155 It
was only because of these colonial advances of the British Empire,
which had legally separated the former Dutch colonies from the
Netherlands, that the Roman-Dutch Law did survive as a living legal
system-not only in the Cape Colony, but also in Ceylon and
Guyana. 156 As a result of the expansion of British hegemony during
the course of the 19th century, Roman-Dutch Law as practiced in the
Cape Colony spread to other parts of southern Africa. 157
As in other British colonies, the government successfully estab-
lished itself in South Africa and replaced the equivalent rules of the
Roman-Dutch Law. These replacements included methods of adminis-
148 See M.B. HOOKER, LEGAL PLURALISM: AN INTRODUCTION TO COLONIAL AND NEO-
COLONIAL LAWS 304 (1975).
149 HARALD BILGER, SUDAFRIKA IN GESCHICHTE UND GEGENWART 56 (1976).
150 See HOOKER, supra note 148, at 250 (the Cape Colony had been administered
by the Dutch Batavian Republic from 1803 until 1806).
151 BILGER, supra note 149, at 63.
152 Zimmermann 1, supra note 135 at 8.
153 See Cambell v. Carolina (1774) 1 Cowp. 204 (209), 98 E.R. 1045 (1047).
154 HAHLO & KAHN, supra note 127, at 575.
155 Zimmermann 1, supra note 135, at 7.
156 KOTZ & ZWEIGERT, supra note 138, at 232; Zimmermann 1, supra note 135 at 7.
157 AMoo, supra note 19, at 61 (noting the Roman-Dutch Law spread to Rhodesia,
Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland, as well as the future South African provinces
of Transvaal, Natal and the Orange Free State); see Zimmermann 1, supra note
135, at 20-23.
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tration, criminal, and civil procedural law, and the corresponding laws
of evidence. 158
The ongoing expansion of these British influences, which per-
meated the laws of procedure but quickly spread to other areas of the
law and led to a subtle Anglicization of the Roman-Dutch Law, can for
the most part be attributed to the fact that almost all contemporary
jurists practicing in South Africa were legally educated in England'5 9
and the official change of the language of the colony and the courts to
English. 6 ° Through forced translation, many legal concepts of Roman-
Dutch Law were substituted by terms of English legal terminology,
which often differed in content, eventually replacing the respective
rules of Roman-Dutch Law in practical use. 6 ' In difficult cases or
when in doubt, a lack of knowledge of the Roman-Dutch Law also often
led English jurists to simply substitute an allegedly comparable En-
glish rule of law.' 6 2 This effect was especially prevalent in the Privy
Council, the court of last instance for all appeals against decisions of
South African courts, where the intricacies of the Roman-Dutch Law
were simply not known.' 6 3
The legal principle of stare decisis et non quieta movere, which
was unknown to Roman-Dutch Law before, was introduced into South
Africa due to a final court of appeals in England, close political and
economic ties, an underdeveloped indigenous legal culture, and the
professional habits of English jurists practicing in the Cape Colony.164
English statutory law explicitly replaced certain aspects of the Roman-
Dutch Law, such as the rules pertaining to company law, securities
law, and trade law.' 6 '
Despite-or because of-these myriad influences, the South Af-
rican legal system cannot be classified as positively belonging to either
the Roman or the common law legal traditions.' 6 6 This indistinctive-
ness is a classifying characteristic of the so-called mixed jurisdic-
tions,17 which the South African legal system exemplifies.
158 HAHuo & KAHN, supra note 127, at 503, 576.
159 Zimmermann 1, supra note 135, at 13.
160 HAHLO & KAHN, supra note 127, at 576.
161 Zimmermann 1, supra note 135, at 14.
162 Id. at 13.
163 Id. at 15.
164 See HAHLO & KAHN, supra note 127, at 578; Zimmermann 1, supra note 135, at
14-15; Erasmus, supra note 1, at 47-48.
165 KOTZ & ZWEIGERT, supra note 138, at 234; AMoo, supra note 20, at 61; Zimmer-
mann 1, supra note 135, at 12.
166 KOTZ & ZWEIGERT, supra note 138, at 235; HAHLO & KAHN, supra note 127, at
585.
167 Erasmus, supra note 1, at 44.
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(d) Current Legal Practice in South Africa
The cultural clashes between the urban British elite and the
rural Boer population during the 19th century culminated in the Boer
War (1899-1902)."6' Following their defeat in the field, the Boers were
nonetheless able to successfully negotiate their claims of independence
and self-determination against the victorious British. The British Par-
liament consented to the founding of the Union of South Africa 16 9 in
1910. This unified the former Cape Colony and the conquered Boer Re-
publics of Transvaal, Natal, and the Orange Free State under one con-
stitution, which-although the Union continued to be part of the
British Empire-granted the Boer population equal political rights. 7 o
The formation of the Union prompted a cultural emancipation
of the Boers, which quickly came to encompass the concepts and the
perception of law. After the legal system in the Union was standard-
ized, the affinity for falling back to English concepts of law continu-
ously became replaced by a new focus on traditional Roman-Dutch
rules of law. 1 7 ' This change can be attributed to a newly found Boer
sense of national pride, the adoption of Afrikaans as an official lan-
guage of the Union, and the beginning scientific examination of Ro-
man-Dutch Law at the newly founded South African universities. 172
These developments led to the following rearrangements in the
ranking order of South African sources of law which is still in force
today: the most important source, statutory law, comprises all legisla-
tion enacted for South Africa, ranging from the Acts of the South Afri-
can Parliament to the ordinances (Placaaten) of the Staten-Generaal of
the Netherlands.1 7 3 The Roman-Dutch Law as the common law of
South Africa is considered to be the second most important source of
law, even outranking case law.1 74 The decisions of South African supe-
rior courts, notwithstanding their major role in legal practice, are con-
sidered to only follow in third place. 175
The resurgence of Roman-Dutch Law in the early 20th century
also curtailed application of stare decisis insofar as prior decisions are
considered not to have a binding effect if they violate core principles of
168 See JORG FiscH, Die Geschichte Suidafrikas 212-17 (1991); BILGER, supra note
149, at 332-38.
169 South Africa Act 152 of 1909.
170 Erasmus, supra note 1, at 212, 217-25.
171 Zimmermann 1, supra note 135, at 35-37.
172 Fagan, supra note 144, at 60-64; Zimmermann 1, supra note 135, at 233.
173 HAHLO & KAHN, supra note 127, at 151; GIBSON, supra note 133, at 38.
174 GIBSON, supra note 133, at 38.
175 Zimmermann 1, supra note 135, at 52; see also HAHLO & KAHN, supra note 127,
at 214-82.
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Roman-Dutch Law.' 76 Because the courts' decisions are not simply
based on pure case law, but have to adhere to the rules set out by the
Roman-Dutch Law, the works of famous Dutch jurists of the 17th and
18th century, the so-called Ou Skrywers, and modern legal scholars
are used by the courts for interpreting the law and reaching and ex-
plaining their judgments. Through referencing these scholarly writ-
ings, contemporary laws of the medieval Netherlands and decisions
reached by Dutch courts find their way into South African jurispru-
dence. 177 Even though there is no uniform rule for the assessment and
evaluation of these writings, 17 1 which are largely dependent on soft
factors like the reputation of the author or the accessibility of the rele-
vant sources, the writings of legal scholars are classified as a fourth
source of law. 1 7 9
(2) Range and Scope of Introduction to Southwest-Africa
In determining the range and scope of the introduction of Ro-
man-Dutch Law to Southwest-Africa, the provisions of section 1 (1) of
the Administration of Justice Proclamation No. 21 of 1919 must be ex-
amined. Through this provision, on January 1st, 1920, the Roman-
Dutch Law became applicable "as existing and applied" in the Cape
Province.18 0 It was introduced with specific limitations in respect to
the time and place of its application not in an abstract, pure, and all-
encompassing form.
d) Continuing Validity of German Colonial Law
From July 9, 1915 until January 1, 1920, various German laws
were repealed and numerous individual provisions had been enacted
under martial law."8 ' Nonetheless, up until the implementation of Ro-
man-Dutch law, the bulk of the remaining German statutes continued
to serve as a legal framework for Southwest-Africa.1 2
According to section 1 (1) of the Administration of Justice Proc-
lamation No. 21 of 1919, on January 1st, 1920 all laws in conflict with
the Roman-Dutch Law were-"to the extent of this conflict"-re-
pealed.1 8 3 The proclamation did not include any other specific provi-
sions as to the continuing validity of German statutory laws. Thus, in
176 Zimmermann 1, supra note 135, at 55; see Dukes v. Marthinusen 1937 (12) AD
at 23.
177 BILGER, supra note 149, at 40-41.
178 Zimmermann 1, supra note 135, at 61-62.
179 GMSON, supra note 133, at 39; HAHLO & KAHN, supra note 127, at 303.
180 Administration of Justice Proclamation 21 of 1919 §§ 1 (1), 16 (S.W. Afr.).
181 See Lockert, supra note 21, at 60.
182 See id.
183 Administration of Justice Proclamation No. 21 of 1919 § 1(1).
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order to answer the question of the continuation of a German law or
rule of law, such law must be individually compared to the Roman-
Dutch Law.
A definite answer can only be given in those cases where the
new South African or Southwest-African legislation explicitly repealed
German law, which often happened in the area of public law. In Sched-
ule I of the Liquor Licensing Proclamation,1 4 the Verordnung des
Kaiserlichen Gouverneurs, betreffend Einfuhr und Handel mit al-
koholischen Getrdnken vom 11. Mdrz 1911-the preceding German
equivalent to this proclamation-was repealed in full. As another ex-
ample, the Dienstanweisung fir die Vermessungsverwaltung vom 12.
Juni 191285 was repealed by Schedule I of the Land Survey Proclama-
tion of 1920.186
Likewise, German statutory law's positive continuation was
easily assessable where new laws expressly referred to it. This usually
did not occur by mere declaratory statements of law, but rather implic-
itly through either amending existing German statutes which other-
wise continued to be in force-exemplified by the additions to the
Kaiserliche Bergverordnung vom 8. August 1905 as the German min-
ing lawlS7 or by taking over specific provisions of German statutory law
as part of new legislation, such as the transfer of those parts of the
German Handelsgesetzbuch (trade law) relating to Kommanditgesell-
schaften aufAktien (limited partnership by shares) into the new Com-
panies Proclamation of 1920.188
The continuing validity of German colonial law must therefore
be assessed on an individual case-by-case basis. While most of the ex-
isting German laws had been explicitly repealed in the abovemen-
tioned manner even before World War 11,189 the South African
administration never issued a provision through which the existing
German law for Southwest-Africa was repealed in complexu.
3. Evaluation
The above analysis of the Southwest-African constitutional law
shows that under martial law as well as during the following times of
international mandate and occupancy, custom-made legislation of
South African origin set up the underlying legal framework for South-
west-Africa. These measures of constitutional legislation, even though
184 Proc 6/1920 (S. Afr.).
185 Amtsblatt far Deutsch-Siidwestafrika of June 24th 1912.
186 Proc 7/1920 (S. Mr.).
187 Proc 12/1920 (S. Afr.).
188 Proc 35/1920 (S. Afr.).
189 Laws of South West Africa, Appendix I, Vol. I, 1915-1922 at 879-881 (for a list
of the German statutory laws officially still in effect in 1923).
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they provided for an interconnection with South African constitutional
law of varying depth, can thus not be classified as legal transplants.
However, all South-West Africa Constitution Acts and their va-
rious amendments established Southwest-Africa as a stand-alone ju-
risdiction. From a legal perspective, even though a de facto annexation
by South Africa might have taken place in the second half of the 20th
century, 190 Southwest-Africa remained independent at all times dur-
ing this period. As a result, the concept of legal transplants continued
to be generally applicable under the South African regime, as South-
west-Africa retained its status as a valid "host jurisdiction" for laws
transplanted from a "donor jurisdiction."
The introduction of the Roman-Dutch law19 1 of South African
origin as the new common law of Southwest-Africa constitutes an im-
position of law and we can therefore classify it as a legal transplant.
Also, as this introduction was limited in range and scope,1 92 a degree
of customization can be said to have been applied to this transplant.
As to the material laws enacted by the South African and
Southwest-African legislation, whether through acts or ordinances, 1 93
no generalizations can be made. A legal transplant occurred where ei-
ther a specific law or a set body of rules was transferred wholly from
another jurisdiction. The same holds true where a law customized or
tailored to Southwest-African circumstances at least contained a rule
or element of law with foreign roots. In order to classify any given leg-
islative measure as a legal transplant, these preconditions must be as-
certained on an individual basis.
The retention of German Colonial law, either through express
referral in new acts, ordinances, or proclamations or through the gen-
eral clause in section 1 (1) of the Administration of Justice Proclama-
tion No. 21 of 1919,194 can also be classified as a legal transplant. Even
though in most cases no direct or express act of transfer 195 took place,
"intended borrowing" passively transplanted the law of the former
German colony. The new South African administration deliberately
opted to hold on to the German laws in place to some degree even
though the implementation of martial law and the subsequent South
African Constitution Acts provided ample opportunity to "clean the
slate" from a legislator's point of view.
190 See supra Part III. B. 2. a) (4).
191 See supra Part III. B. 2. c).
192 See supra Part III. B. 2. c) (2).
193 See supra Part III. B. 2. b).
194 See supra Part III. B. 2. d).
195 Such as express referral to or use of German provisions in new legislative mea-
sures. See supra Part III. B. 2. d).
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The newly established legal system carried over numerous pro-
visions of German colonial law through the general provisions of the
Administration of Justice Proclamation No. 21 of 1919 or declaratory
references in more specific statutory law.1'9 As shown above, the
transplanted law of the former German colony has been customized by
either subordinating the law to the rules of the Roman-Dutch Law in
general, or by re-packaging or re-integrating certain provisions from
German statutory law into new legislative measures, as seen in nu-
merous specific cases. 197
4. Conflicts
At first glance, both the transplantation of Roman-Dutch
Law-a rounded-out legal system in itself-and German colonial pro-
visions do not seem to carry any intrinsic cause for conflict. But since
the introduction and applicability of the Roman-Dutch Law, and
through it the continued validity of German colonial law, were limited
in range and scope,' 98 a closer look is imperative.
a) Transplanting the Roman-Dutch Law
In view of a lack of authoritative codifications of the Roman-
Dutch Law, which could be relied upon as reference for the scope of the
Roman-Dutch Law in effect at a certain place at a specific point in
time, no easy assessments as to the effects of the limitations of its
transfer into Southwest-Africa can be made. The wording of Proclama-
tion No. 21 of 1919 makes explicit reference to the Roman-Dutch Law"as existing and applied" in the Cape Province,' 9 9 but does not answer
the question of whether, or to what extent, any influences that the
common law or statutory law of English origin may have had on the
body of Roman-Dutch Law are to be taken into account.
Since Proclamation No. 21 of 1919 only makes provisions for
transferring the common law, but not the statutory law, of the Cape
Province, it can be argued that because of its deep intermixture with
elements of English law-both common law and statutory-the body
of Roman-Dutch Law as referred to in Proclamation No. 21 of 1919 has
been full of "gaps" or "cavities."20 0 Owing to the primacy of statutory
law, such "gaps" or "cavities" tear into the body of Roman-Dutch Law
of the Cape Province whenever one of its parts had been "broken off'
196 See supra Part III. B. 2. d).
197 See Lockert, supra note 21, at 145-260 (exemplary and extensive analysis of
the continuity of the German Colonial mining law provisions of the Kaiserliche
Bergverordnung vom 8. August 1905).198 Administration of Justice Proclamation Act 21 of 1919 §1(1) (S.W. Mr.).
199 Id.
200 Id.
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and substituted by a statutory rule of law of English origin.2 0 1 One has
to accurately differentiate whether British legislation indeed substi-
tuted specific parts or rather simply added to certain underdeveloped
aspects or areas of the Roman-Dutch Law, or whether through "subtle
reception"20 2 new rules of law or legal procedures had been introduced
without a basis in statutory law. One must also examine whether
these new rules classified part of the Roman-Dutch common law by
contemporary jurists.2 °3
Only in this last case did Proclamation No. 21 of 1919 bring
about a reception of English rules of law and procedures in Southwest-
Africa, provided that these English influences permeated the Roman-
Dutch Law before the date of January 1st, 1920 and were indeed ac-
cepted in the Cape Province itself. Therefore, the claim2 ° 4 that all En-
glish rules of law in effect in the Cape Province were also transferred
to Southwest-Africa by Proclamation No. 21 of 1919 is to be rejected as
too broad and imprecise. The provisions of this Proclamation merely
introduced a perforated body of the Roman-Dutch Law into Southwest-
Africa, the gaps in which could only be closed through the enactment
of the specific pieces of legislation responsible for this erosion in (or
for) Southwest-Africa.
It hence comes as no surprise that after the introduction of the
Roman-Dutch Law in 1920, an abundance of such legislative measures
were being realized, which not only dealt with areas of public law not
covered by the Roman-Dutch common law, but also entailed changes of
or additions to the body of the Roman-Dutch Law. By looking at spe-
cific acts, these legislative measures and their relation to and influ-
ence on the body of Roman-Dutch Law in Southwest-Africa can be
classified and exemplified as follows:
- The regulation of an issue of public law, which as such is not
comprised by the Roman-Dutch Law itself, can be exempli-
fied through the aforementioned Southwest-African Admin-
istrator's Liquor Licensing Proclamation.2 °5  This act
regulates importing and trading alcoholic beverages. This is
an area of public law to which the Roman-Dutch Law does
not refer. Accordingly, in Schedule I of the Liquor Licensing
Proclamation, the preceding German equivalent to this
201 Id.
202 Zimmerman 1, supra note 135, at 13 (for use of term "subtle reception").
203 The abolishment of this practice was one of the main goals of South African
jurists when re-focusing on the Roman-Dutch Law in the beginning of the 20th
century. See Zimmerman 1, supra note 135, at 52; HAHLO & KAHN, supra note 127,
at 214-82.
204 See AMoo, supra note 19, at 60.
205 Liquor Licensing Proclamation 6 of 1920, in LAWS OF SOUTH WEST AFRICA, Vol.
I, 1915-1922, at 163-92.
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proclamation is repealed in full. 2° 6 Under section 1 (1) of the
Administration of Justice Proclamation No. 21 of 1919 this
would be unnecessary had this area of law been encom-
passed by the Roman-Dutch Law.20 7
- To the contrary, the area of labor law as regulated by the
Southwest-African Administrator's Masters and Servants
Proclamation No. 34 of 1920208 is covered by the legal figure
of locatio conductio operarum20 9 of the Roman-Dutch Law.
This figure had not been replaced in full by the Masters and
Servants Acts of the Cape Colony in 1856 and 1873,21° as
their provisions only applied to a certain class of employ-
ees, 21 1 but remained in force alongside the statutory regula-
tions of these Acts.2 1 2
- As this prior British legislation thus had not torn away
parts of the body of the Roman-Dutch Law, the Masters and
Servants Proclamation was obviously meant not to patch,
add to, or specify, but rather to effect an outright change to
the Roman-Dutch Law in this regard. This proclamation can
therefore be seen as an example of legislation intended to
replace parts of the Roman-Dutch Law.
- Prime examples for the necessity to patch up cavities left in
the body of the Roman-Dutch Law by British or South Afri-
can statutes through legislation for Southwest-Africa can be
found by looking at company law and the law of succession.
British statutory law in the 19th century replaced almost all
parts of Roman-Dutch Law related to company law.2 13 The
Southwest-African Administrator introduced the company
law enacted for the South African Province Transvaal in
206 Id.
207 Administrative Proclamation Act 21 of 1919 (Cape).
208 Masters and Servants Proclamation 34 of 1920, in LAWS OF SOUTH WEST AF-
RICA, Vol. I, 1915-1922, at 336-66.
209 See Zimmermann 1, supra note 135, at 129-31; Eltjo Schrage, Locatio Conduc-
tio, in DAS ROMISCH-HOLLANDISCHE RECHT. FORTSCHRITTE DES ZIVLRECHTS IM 17.
UND 18. JAHRHUNDERT 245, 262-68.
210 Masters and Servants Act 15 of 1856 (Cape); Masters and Servants Act 18 of
1873 (Cape).
211 Barney Jordaan, Employment Relations, in SOUTHERN CROSS: CIVIL LAW AND
COMMON LAW IN SOUTH AFRICA 389, 397 (Reinhard Zimmerman & D.P. Visser
eds., 1996); Rochelle Le Roux, The Evolution of the Contract of Employment in
South Africa, 39 INDUS. L.J., June 2010, at 139, 143-44.
212 Jordaan, supra note 211, at 397-415; Le Roux, supra note 233, at 145-46.
213 Zimmermann 1, supra note 135, at 12.
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1909214 in toto to Southwest-Africa in order to fill this
gap.2 15
English rules of law substituted from certain fundamental
parts of the Roman-Dutch laws of succession. In 1874 the
formal Succession Act replaced the rules of the Roman-
Dutch Law relating to the legal portion of the share for heirs
at law.2 16 The provisions relating to the freedom of the tes-
tator to make a will thus were not part of the body of Ro-
man-Dutch law transferred to Southwest-Africa and had to
be re-established by Southwest-African statutory law. Ac-
cordingly, in 1920 the Administrator declared the Wills
Proclamation.2 1 7
The difficulty of categorizing the various receptions of En-
glish rules of law into the body of the Roman-Dutch Law,
and the legal uncertainties caused by its mere fragmentary
transfer to Southwest-Africa can be exemplified by the short
phrasing of the Bills of Exchange Proclamation.2 1 Without
relating to any specific act or proclamation, the Administra-
tor simply introduced all laws on cheques and bills of ex-
change in force in the Cape Province to Southwest-Africa
and declared all other provisions possibly in conflict there-
with to be repealed.
The law on cheques and bills of exchange as codified in the
Bills of Exchange Act of 1893219 is thus considered to be one
of the areas of the Roman-Dutch Law which had been influ-
enced and changed the most by English-influenced legisla-
tion.220 The wording of the Bills of Exchange Proclamation
of 1920, simply transplanting the relevant law of the Cape
Province as a whole, allowed circumventing the complex le-
gal question of the extent of these influences on the body of
Roman-Dutch Law at the cost of customization and
flexibility.
214 Transvaal Companies Act (Act No. 31/1909) (Transvaal).
215 Companies Proclamation No. 35 of 1920, in LAWS OF SOUTH WEST AFRICA, Vol.
I, 1915-1922, 367-70.
216 Succession Act §2 (Act No. 23/1874) (Cape).
217 Wills Proclamation 23 of 1920, in LAWS OF SOUTH WEST AFRICA, Vol. I, 1915-
1922, at 269-71.
218 Bills of Exchange Proclamation 20 of 1920, in: Laws of South West Africa, Vol.
I, 1915-1922, p. 230.
219 Bills of Exchange Act 19 of 1893 (Cape).
220 Charl Hugo, Negotiable Instruments, in SOUTHERN CROSS: CWIL LAW AND COM-
MON LAW IN SOUTH AFRICA 481, 485-520 (Reinhard Zimmerman & D.P. Visser eds.,
1996).
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In summary, the Administration of Justice Proclamation No.
21 of 1919 caused a great degree of legal uncertainty, because it did
not provide for a transfer of statutory laws that had taken the place of
the Roman-Dutch Law in certain areas. The extent to which the Ro-
man-Dutch Law was transplanted to Southwest-Africa had to be
checked in every single case of doubt, as no authoritative codification
could be referred to for the status quo of the Roman-Dutch Law as
practiced in the Cape Province at the time of transfer. While changes
in the Cape Province after January 1st, 1920 did not apply to the Ro-
man-Dutch Law transferred to Southwest-Africa, all legislation en-
acted in and for the Cape Province before this date had to be checked
for possible effects on the body of the Roman-Dutch Law.
b) Transplanting German Colonial Law
This uncertainty in regard to the scope of the transplant of Ro-
man-Dutch Law also affected the continuing validity of German colo-
nial law. When examining whether a German rule of civil law was
repealed under the provisions of section 1 (1) of the Administration of
Justice Proclamation No. 21 of 1919, one did not only have to compare
the rule in question to the Roman-Dutch Law in a first step, but to
further investigate whether a contrary provision of the Roman-Dutch
Law had been modified or substituted by English-influenced legisla-
tion before having been transplanted to Southwest-Africa. In that case
the German rule of law could only be repealed under the Proclamation
No. 21 of 1919 if the "gap" caused by this influence in the body of the
Roman-Dutch Law had been subsequently closed through correspond-
ing legislation, thus necessitating a third step of confirmation. At least
when relying on section 1 (1) of the Administration of Justice Procla-
mation No., 21 of 1919 to repeal German laws, the legislators were
bound to thoroughly investigate the relationship of these laws to the
body of Roman-Dutch Law as transplanted to Southwest-Africa.
However, looking at how contemporary legal practice dealt
with possible conflicts, it becomes evident that this scientific approach
was often neglected in favor of more practical solutions: When the ex-
isting Gesellschaften mit beschrdnkter Haftung (companies with lim-
ited liabilities) were-instead of being transformed or replaced-
simply legally equated with newly founded proprietary limited compa-
nies through the Companies Proclamation of 1920,221 the resulting le-
gal question as to whether the rules of the German Handelsgesetzbuch
(trade law) or the Southwest-African Companies Act of 1920 were to be
applied for actions such as an increase in share capital, was circum-
vented. This was achieved by simply transforming the Gesellschaften
221 Companies Proclamation 35 of 1920 § 14 in: Laws of South West Africa, Vol. I,
1915-1922, at 367-70.
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mit beschrdnkter Haftung into proprietary limited companies, even
though the Companies Act of 1920 did not provide a legal basis for
this.22 2 Thus, it did not become necessary to scrutinize if and to what
extent the rules of the German Handelsgesetzbuch had been carried
over into the new Southwest-African legal system.
In effect, because of the elusive restrictions imposed on the in-
troduction of the Roman-Dutch legal system, the provisions of the Ad-
ministration of Justice Act No. 21 of 1919 and thus the transplantation
of both the Roman-Dutch Law and the German colonial law were
laden with conflict.
5. Summary
After subjugating the former German colony in 1915, South Af-
rica implemented custom-made constitutional legislation in South-
west-Africa. This legislation subsequently tailored and adjusted the
changing political goals of the South African administration during
the three phases of occupation. While it allowed for small and variable
degrees of Southwest-African self-determination, it secured South Af-
rican supremacy at all times.
Through the Administration of Justice Proclamation No. 21 of
1919, the Roman-Dutch Law "as existing and applied in the Province
of the Cape of Good Hope" on January 1st, 1920 was introduced as the
new common law of Southwest-Africa. 2 23 At the same time, this Proc-
lamation only repealed laws or rules of law in force at the time in con-
flict with the Roman-Dutch Law. Because of these provisions, German
colonial laws were not abolished in their entirety. Instead, German
laws not in conflict with this customized form of the Roman-Dutch
Law were effectively transplanted into the new jurisdiction, either
through "passive" perpetuation or explicit declaratory (re-)enactment.
The Roman-Dutch Law in general was disconnected from fu-
ture legal developments in South Africa, unlike the prior framework
implemented by the German Empire, which kept the underlying foun-
dations of the legal system transplanted to the colony connected to the
donor jurisdiction through the Schutzgebietsgesetz and Konsularger-
ichtsbarkeitsgesetz.2 2 4 While discrepancies between the fundamentals
of the transplanted legal system and subsequent statutory law enacted
for or transferred into the host jurisdiction-the legal inconsistencies
that threatened the German colony 22 -were thus ruled out and were
in turn replaced by another grave problem.
222 See Lorentz & Bone, Windhoek, Case No. D 336/48 of November 28th 1949.
223 Proclamation 21 of 1919 (Cape).
224 See supra Part III. A. 5.
225 See supra Part III. A. 4. and 5.
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The body of the Roman-Dutch Law was received fragmented
and inchoate due to a number of influences-most notably the English
common law and conflicting statutory provisions. It had not been
transferred to Southwest-Africa in its whole form. 2 6 As a result of
this, the base on which further legislative measures had to be built
was fragile and difficult to predict. This most notably became apparent
when trying to ascertain the extent to which German colonial laws
continued to apply.
It can be questioned whether these conflicts had been consid-
ered by contemporary jurists at all, as Southwest-African legal and
legislative practice in general did not let itself be perturbed by the pos-
sibility of ramifications resulting from these shortcomings. Nonethe-
less, the "gaps" and "cavities" in the body of the Roman-Dutch Law
and the relating uncertainty as to the perpetuation of German colonial
law constituted a veritable theoretical obstacle, restraining the dili-
gent lawgiver and lawyer.
C. Namibian Independence
1. Historical Overview
The South African occupancy officially ended on March 21st,
1990, the Namibian Day of Independence, when former SWAPO-leader
and newly appointed State President Sam Nujoma swore an oath in
front of the General Secretary of the United Nations to uphold the
Namibian Constitution, which had been developed in less than three
months by the Constituent Assembly.2 2 7
The constitution introduced a presidential democracy and a
catalogue of basic rights, modeled after the German Grundgesetz. A
myriad of international experts, legal scholars, and human rights or-
ganizations took part in its development, and it claimed to be one of
the most modern constitutions of its time.2 2 s
Even though the constitution places much power into the
hands of the president, and Namibian political realities often grant the
majority party SWAPO-which has continuously been voted into
power since the days of independence-an absolute majority in parlia-
226 See supra Part III. B. 4 a); Lockert, supra note 22, at 105-11.
227 Frank Leonhard Watz, Die Grundrechte in der Verfassung der Republik
Namibia vom 21. Marz 1990 [The Fundamental Rights in the Constitution of the
Republic of Namibia of March 21, 1990] (2003) (published Ph.D. dissertation,
Christian-Albrechts-Universitat Kiel, Gottingen, Windhoek) at 19-33 (detailing
the course of the Constituent Assembly and the general layout of the Namibian
Constitution).
228 Id. at 19.
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ment, the constitution has stood the test of time. This is due to the
well-functioning and largely independent judiciary.2 2 9
In the Namibian national economy, even though the impor-
tance of the tertiary sector with a focus on tourism has steadily grown
in the years following independence, the natural resources still con-
tinue to play a vital role. The primary industries of fishing, farming,
and mining formed a quarter of the gross domestic product in 2009.230
The share of the gross domestic product of mining alone measured 8%
in 2012, while the mining sector at the same time accounted for 50% of
the export volume of Namibia.2 3 1
Diamond mining especially is still the driving force of the
Namibian economy and continues to contribute to industrial growth
just as it had during German colonial times and the days of South Afri-
can occupancy. Between 1990 and 2006, diamond mining alone earned
an average of 8-10% of the gross domestic product, while the rest of the
mining industry averaged a share of 3%.232 Accordingly, it continues
to be highly regulated.2 33 Apart from diamond mining, the rise of cor-
responding prices on the world-market in the wake of the economic
crisis of 2008 also has led to a renewed upsurge in the mining of ura-
nium. In two mines, Namibia supplies 10% of the world's demands of
uranium oxide, making Namibia the fourth largest producer in the
world.2 3 4
2. Namibian Constitution
The interesting question of whether and to what extent the
Namibian Constitution itself draws on other legal systems and incor-
porates transplants of legal rules cannot be answered in the scope of
this analysis.2 3 5 With regard to the questions posed by this article and
the results of its prior sections, the following description of the
Namibian Constitution therefore limits itself to the examination of
provisions relating to the transfer and incorporation of statutory laws
as well as the Roman-Dutch Law into the nascent Namibian legal
system.
229 See Lockert, supra note 21, at 120-23 (giving a detailed introduction to the
Namibian judiciary); id. at 132-42.
230 See id. at 36.
231 Central Intelligence Agency, Namibia, THE WORLD FACTBOOK, (Jan. 28, 2014),
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/wa.html.
232 Schneider, supra note 77, at 303.
233 See Lockert, supra note 21, at 180-87, 204-06, 224, 244.
234 Central Intelligence Agency, Namibia, THE WORLD FACTBOOK, (Jan. 28, 2014),
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/wa.html.
235 See Lockert, supra note 21, at 116-26 (providing an introductory overview of
the Namibian Constitution); Watz, supra note 227 (providing a detailed analysis of
the Namibian Constitution).
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a) Continuing Validity of Existing Statutory Laws
In order to prevent the creation of a legal vacuum through the
declaration of independence, the Namibian Constitution incorporates
an all-out adoption of all laws in effect in Namibia on the date of inde-
pendence, March 21st, 1990, in its Article 140 section 1:
The Law in Force at the Date of Independence
(1) Subject to the provisions of this Constitution, all
laws which were in force immediately before the
date of Independence shall remain in force until re-
pealed or amended by Act of Parliament or until
they are declared unconstitutional by a competent
Court.2 36
In its Article 25 section 1 lit. (b), the Namibian Constitution
makes further provisions for legal protection against laws predating
the Constitution and the declaration of such laws as unconstitu-
tional.2 37 Article 140 of the Constitution only provides detailed rules
for the transfer and the interpretation of statutes of alleged South Af-
rican origin-i.e. Acts, Proclamations and Ordinances-in its sections
2 to 5.2 38 Because of the clear wording of its section 1, which merely
contains the broad and all-encompassing term "laws," in lack of any
clear provisions to the contrary, the Constitution's Article 140 can only
be interpreted in a way as to also encompass all German laws or rules
of law still in force at the day of independence. Thus, the Namibian
Constitution does not provide for a "clean cut" in legislation either, but
upholds the basic line of legal continuity that can trace its beginnings
back to German colonial times.23 9
b) Continuing Validity of the Roman-Dutch Law
The question whether the term "laws" of Article 140 section 1
of the Constitution can also be read to encompass the Roman-Dutch
Law is made superfluous by Article 66 of the Constitution:
Customary and Common Law
(1) Both the customary law and the common law of
Namibia in force on the date of Independence shall
remain valid to the extent to which such customary
or common law does not conflict with this Constitu-
tion or any other statutory law.
(2) Subject to the terms of this Constitution, any part of
such common law or customary law may be repealed
236 NAMIB. CONST. Art. 140 § 1.
237 See NAMfs. CONST. Art. 25 § 1 cl. b.
238 NAMIB. CONST. Art. 140 §§ 2-5.
239 See Lockert, supra note 21 (analyzing this line of continuity).
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or modified by Act of Parliament, and the applica-
tion thereof may be confined to particular parts of
Namibia or to particular periods.2 4 °
According to the Constitution, both the customary law241 and
the Roman-Dutch Law as the common law of the land are valid sources
of law, which-like all other sources of law-have to adhere to the pri-
macy of the Constitution 24 2 and can be suspended or replaced by statu-
tory legislation. In judicial practice, the constitutionality of all rules of
the Roman-Dutch Law employed in court after the day of indepen-
dence has to be put to a fundamental examination. 24 3 A specific consti-
tutional court does not exist. While there are no formal rules for this
examination, courts must state the considered constitutionality of a
rule when relating to a certain rule of the Roman-Dutch Law.2 4 4
3. Evaluation
The declaration of independence did not bring sudden cataclys-
mic changes to the everyday workings of the Namibian legal system.
Instead, the newly elected Namibian government aimed for slow and
smooth adjustments, fostering change without endangering the status
quo of legal praxis.
The practice of transferring the Roman-Dutch Law and all
statutory laws into the newly established Namibian legal system
through the explicit provisions of Articles 66 and 140 of the Constitu-
tion can-just like the transfer of German colonial law during the
times of South African occupancy 24 5-be classified as a conscientious
legal transplantation by means of "intended borrowing."
While those transplants were not accompanied by acts of cus-
tomization per se, both Roman-Dutch Law and statutory laws preced-
ing independence were subjugated to the supremacy of the Namibian
Constitution as the "supreme law of the land."2 46 As such, the Consti-
tution provided for means of customizing these transplants either di-
rectly through the powers vested in the new Namibian executive and
240 NAMIB. CONST. Art. 66 §§ 1-2.
241 See AMoo, supra note 19, at 102-06; for a detailed examination of the custom-
ary law see HINZ, supra note 18.
242 Because its Article 1, section 6 states that the Constitution is the supreme law
of the land in Namibia, the provisions of its Article 66, section 1 are merely of a
declaratory nature.
243 Myburgh v. Commercial Bank of Namib., 1994 NR 41 (HC); see AMoo supra
note 19, at 105.
244 See AMoo, supra note 19, at 125 (comparing this to the practice of obiter dicta).
245 See supra Part III. B. 3.
246 See NA~m. CONST. Art. 1 § 6.
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legislative branches of government,24 7 or indirectly through review of
their constitutionality by the judiciary.2 4 s
4. Conflicts
The provisions of Article 66 of the Namibian Constitution en-
sure a continuity of the application of the Roman-Dutch Law ever
since its introduction into Southwest-Africa by the Administration of
Justice Proclamation No. 21 of 1919.249 All vagueness and all ambigui-
ties as to the range and scope of its application are evened out by the
wording of Article 66 section 1 of the Constitution. This section does
not relate to the Roman-Dutch Law as such, but merely to the "com-
mon law of Namibia" in force at the day of independence. 25 ° This for-
mulation does not only encompass the Roman-Dutch Law in its
original or an amended form, but also all rules of law that have grown
to become considered part of the common law of Namibia, whether as
additions, supplements or substitutes to rules of the Roman-Dutch
Law. In theory, this wording also allows for specific German rules of
law to be part of the Namibian common law, provided that these rules
had grown to be accepted as parts of the common law before the day of
independence.
This provision, however, does not alleviate the effects of the
shortcomings of the Administration of Justice Proclamation No. 21 of
1919 itself. The necessary examinations described above 25 1 theoreti-
cally still must be performed every time a specific rule of the Roman-
Dutch Law is employed. While in practice all possible "gaps" or "cavi-
ties" in the body of the Roman-Dutch Law might have been filled by
almost a century of South African and Namibian legislation, a source
of legal uncertainty remains and has to be factored in by the diligent
jurist.
Another source of legal uncertainty in praxis is the mandatory
constitutional review of every rule of the Roman-Dutch Law, which
makes it necessary for careful law-users to keep track of all decisions
which have put the constitutionality of certain areas of the Roman-
Dutch Law to a test, a task which is complicated by the fact that there
is no dedicated constitutional court.
247 See NAmIB. CONST. Chs 5-8; see Lockert, supra note 22, at 116-29.
248 See NAMIB. CONST. Ch. 9; see Lockert, supra note 22, at 129-40.
249 Nico Horn, The Independence of the Judiciary in Pre-independent Namibia:
Legal challenges under the Pre-independence Bill of Rights (1985-1990), in The
Independence of the Judiciary in Namibia 45, 45 (Nico Horn & Anton B6sl eds.,
Macmillian Education Namibia 2008).
250 NAMIB. CONST. Art. 66 § 1.
251 See supra Part III. B. 2. c). (2).
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5. Summary
For the first time since the days of German colonialism,
Namibian independence enabled the people of Southwest-Africa to de-
termine the course of their country's politics free from any external
influence. The declaration of independence on March 21st, 1990 and
the resulting sovereignty of the Republic of Namibia marked a political
turning point in Southwest-African history.
However, this clear cut theory was not extended ad hoc from
politics to the legal system. In order to avoid the creation of a legal
vacuum, Namibian legislators, just like the South African oppressors
before them, favored the slow and consecutive adjustment of the legal
system, and opted for the-if only temporary-perpetuation of existing
laws.
Through Articles 66 and 140 of the Namibian Constitution, the
Roman-Dutch Law and existing statutory laws already applicable
before the date of independence were intentionally "borrowed" and
thus transplanted into the jurisdiction newly established by the
Namibian Constitution. While the transfer itself had been all-encom-
passing, it did not alleviate the shortcomings of the Administration of
Justice Proclamation No. 21 of 1919 of South African origin, namely
the fragmentary introduction of the Roman-Dutch Law. In addition,
the pre-existing laws were subjected to the supremacy of the Namibian
Constitution. While this allowed for ample customization of these laws
on the one side, the necessity of constitutional review by the judici-
ary-naturally-overshadowed the scope of their applicability with le-
gal uncertainty of some extent on the other side.
As a result, parts of the underlying fundament of the Namibian
legal system continue to be-at least in theory-weakened as to this
day. Before a specific rule of traditional Roman-Dutch Law is put to
use in Namibia, law-users not only have to ascertain whether this rule
is indeed encompassed by the fragmented and therefore unique itera-
tion of this body of law in force in Namibia, but also have to ensure its
constitutionality by referencing it against the provisions of the
Namibian Constitution.
IV. CONCLUSIONS
Notwithstanding the indigenous customary law practiced in
Southwest-Africa since primeval times, the introduction of systematic,
codified law can be traced back to the formation of the Schutzvertrdge
with local chieftains by German colonialists. Starting from these hum-
ble beginnings, this article outlined the development of the modern
Namibian legal system, re-tracing the implementation of German colo-
nial law, the introduction of the Roman-Dutch legal system by South
African occupants in the course of the 20th century, and the coming-
into-effect of the Namibian Constitution.
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Even though the Republic of Namibia only reached full sover-
eignty through its declaration of independence in 1990, the territory of
Southwest-Africa formed a distinct jurisdiction during German and
South African hegemony. This article portrayed how and to what ex-
tent legal transplants were used to introduce both German colonial
legislation and South African laws and subsequently analyzed the re-
sulting problems and conflicts encountered by the respective legisla-
tors and their successors.
As outlined in the introduction, these findings are not meant to
be generalized, but should rather be seen as stand-alone examples for
the execution of legal transplants. The feasibility of applying any les-
sons learned or caveats derived from these examples to upcoming un-
dertakings of legal transplantation will have to be assessed on a case-
to-case basis in the future.
For the German period, the use of legal transplants is exempli-
fied by the introduction of German civil and criminal law within the
set of rules provided by the Konsulargerichtsbarkeitsgesetz and the
Schutzgebietsgesetz. This legal framework kept the transplanted laws
connected to corresponding legal proceedings and developments in the
"donor jurisdiction"-the German Empire-while also allowing for
customization as a means of adapting to local circumstances. It lacked
provisions for regulating conflicts between legislative changes
originating in the donor jurisdiction and local acts of customization.
Due to the political realities-the German Emperor effectively ruled
supreme-this never became an issue during the lifespan of the South-
west-African colony. However, in light of the proceeding emancipation
of the colonists, such conflicts were not to be ruled out completely. Had
the "host jurisdiction" not been as dependent on the "donor jurisdic-
tion" as it was in the given colonial setup, it might have become neces-
sary to face these problems after all.
The South African period most notably stands for the introduc-
tion of the Roman-Dutch Law into Southwest-Africa. While the limita-
tion of range and scope of its introduction served to circumvent the
conflicts mentioned in the above paragraph, in this particular case it
caused other, even more severe problems instead:
The introductory portrayal of the Roman-Dutch Law in this ar-
ticle shows that, after it had been subjected to English legal practice
and legislation for more than a century, the body of the Roman-Dutch
Law as practiced in the Cape Province on January 1st, 1920 had been
full of "gaps" and "cavities." As the South African statutory law that
effectively filled out these "gaps" had not been transplanted into or
enacted for Southwest-Africa in complexu, the body of Southwest-Afri-
can Roman-Dutch Law remained incomplete.
This shortfall in turn not only affected the subsequent South
African legislation for Southwest-Africa in general and the perpetua-
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tion of German colonial law in particular, but continues to be a detri-
ment to the jurisprudential manageability of Namibian common law
and pre-independence statutory legislation as to this day. While in
practice most of these "gaps" may have been filled out by subsequent
statutory enactments, a readily accessible overview of these "patches"
does not exist.
Due to lack of explicit provisions in statutory law, both diligent
practitioners of law and academic scholars are forced to trace back the
history of every single rule of the Roman-Dutch Law well into the 19th
century before making a definite assumption about their applicability
in Namibia. Likewise, unless ruled out by statutory enactment or an
in-depth analysis on a case-to-case basis, the perpetuation of German
colonial law into the Namibian jurisdiction remains a possibility.25 2
The Namibian example shows that successful legal transplant-
ing not only demands consideration of the cultural, economic, and po-
litical backdrop in light of the connection between "host jurisdiction"
and "donor jurisdiction" and corresponding customization of the laws
in question, but first and foremost: accuracy, adequate care, and due
diligence in jurisprudential execution.
252 See Lockert, supra note 21 (providing an in-depth analysis of aspects of con-
tinuity in the development of the Namibian legal system and the perpetuation of
basic rules of Imperial German mining law).
